NAVAL SECURITY MANAGER COURSE

EXERCISE GUIDE

Page

NAVAL SECURITY MANAGER COURSE EXERCISE GUIDE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents						i
Security Education Exercise	- L	esson	Topic	2.2		2-2-1
Classification/Marking Exercise	- L	esson	Topic	4.2		4-2-1
Control Measures Exercise	- L	esson	Topic	5.3	•••	5-3-1
Safeguarding/Storage Exercise	- L	esson	Topic	5.7		5-7-1
Personnel Security Exercise	- L	esson	Topic	7.4		7-4-1
Security Incidents Exercise	- L	esson	Topic	8.2		8-2-1

06-1 i

ASSIGNMENT SHEET 2.2

Security Education Exercise

INTRODUCTION

This exercise provides practical application of information provided in Lesson Topic 2.1

LESSON TOPIC OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of lesson topic 2.1 and this exercise, you will be able to:

Complete various elements of a command security education program

EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

There are three assignments for this exercise, all three to be done by each individual/team.

You will be given time to complete the assignments individually. Each of you will use your own command as the basis for your solutions.

You will then meet with your team to discuss (share) your solutions. The team leader will select one team member to present his solution.

Using each of the topics given below, list what would be covered under each topic during a Refresher Briefing:

1. Unique security considerations for the command

2. Aspects of the foreign intelligence threat to the command mission

3. Specific past command security incidents/concerns

4. Individual security responsibilities

List topics to be emphasized during an Orientation Briefing

Draft a one-year Security Education Plan, incorporating all required briefings and specifying the frequency and audience. Include any Special Briefings to be given. You do NOT need to indicate what topics will be covered in the briefings.

ASSIGNMENT SHEET 4.2

Classification/Marking Exercise

INTRODUCTION

This team exercise provides practical application of information provided in lesson topics 3.1, Classification Management and 4.1, Marking of Classified information. The goal is to help you learn to use a security classification guide and to correctly apply classification markings.

LESSON TOPIC OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of lesson topics 3.1, 4.1 and this exercise, you will be able to:

- Apply the principles of classification management. 1.
- 2. Use security classification guides and other sources to determine appropriate classification and downgrading and declassification instructions.
- Apply correct classification markings to a variety of 3. information (e.g., publications, correspondence, messages, PowerPoint slide presentations and photographs).

EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

There are three assignments for this exercise, all three to be done by each individual/team.

You will use Security Classification Guides to determine classification and downgrading and declassification instructions for a letter. Then, you will use those determinations as a basis to apply appropriate security markings to the letter. Finally, you will apply the appropriate classification and associated markings to a letter of transmittal.

06-1 4 - 2 - 1

You will use the security classification guides on page 4-2-5 to determine the classification and downgrading and declassification instructions for the letter on pages 4-2-3 and 4.

- 1. Underline the information in each paragraph of the letter that you found referenced on page 4-2-5.
- 2. Adjacent to each element of classifiable information:
 - a. Indicate the applicable security classification level, intelligence control markings, warning notices, and downgrading and declassification requirements, and
 - b. Note the security classification guide paragraph number/letter where you found the information.

06-1 4-2-2

Assignment 1 - Operation Triple Swine letter, page 1

Letterhead

3320 Ser XX/XXXX 19 Dec XX

From: Commanding Officer, USS Roosevelt (CVN 71)

Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

UPDATE ON OPERATION TRIPLE SWINE Subj:

- 1. As you know, I had three little pigs who wanted to construct homes but, due to budgetary constraints, could not.
- 2. The three pigs decided they should pool the money they had and play the state lottery, which they did.
- 3. Last month they won the lottery and divided the winnings. Each used his winnings to purchase building materials from Lowe's Building Supply to construct a new house.
- 4. Each of the pigs, who were brothers, decided to use a different material:
 - a. Pig #1 used straw.
 - b. Pig #2, who had whiskers, used sticks.
 - c. Pig #3, the smart one, used bricks.

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED BUT MARKED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY.

0.6 - 14 - 2 - 3 Assignment 1 (continued) - Operation Triple Swine letter, page 2

Subj: UPDATE ON OPERATION TRIPLE SWINE

- 5. Shortly after they completed construction, a hungry wolf wandered past and decided he would capture the three little pigs and have them for lunch.
- 6. The wolf vigorously attacked the three pig's houses, with the following results:
- a. He destroyed pig #1 and pig #2's homes by huffing and puffing and then ate them.
- b. But he became disoriented and frightened when his attack on the smart pig's home proved unsuccessful.
- 7. It is apparent that houses made from straw and sticks lack the strength to withstand persistent winds.
- 8. Based upon the preceding report, it is suggested that the name "Operation Triple Swine" (U) be changed.

R. E. TIPPETT By direction

2

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0.6 - 14 - 2 - 4

Α

B

C

Classification Guide, OPNAVINST S5513.44D, enclosure (25):

SECRET

Title: Pig Criteria (U) Date: 2 June 2003

> Number of pigs
> Relationship of pigs
> Fact pigs are little
> Fact of hair on chin C-08 S-10 S-11 5. Fact that one pig is smart S-09 6. Fact pigs played or won lottery C-X3

> > SECRET

Classification Guide - OPNAVINST S5513.15, enclosure (5)

SECRET

Title: Wolf Intelligence (U)

Date: 25 May 2003

Existence of wolf 1. IJ 2. Size of wolf C-X1 Fact that wolf can be frightened C/NF-X1 3. 4. Intent to capture pigs S/NF5. Motivation of wolf C-05
6. Means of house destruction C-09
7. Effectiveness of destruction means S-X1 S/NF-X1 SECRET/NOFORN

Classification Guide - OPNAVINST C5513.2, enclosure(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Title: Building Codes (U)

Date: 10 Feb 2004

2.

Construction material used

a. Pig #1 used straw b. Pig #2 used sticks C-11 Pig #3 used bricks C-11 c. Sources of building materials U

C-X1 3. Durability of houses Sources of funds for construction 4. C/NF-X1

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

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0.6 - 14 - 2 - 5

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PURPO	SES (ONL	<u> </u>				

Use the determinations you made in Assignment 1 to apply the appropriate markings to the Operation Triple Swine letter.

> Letterhead _____

> > 3320 Ser XX/XXXX 19 Dec XX

From: Commanding Officer, USS Roosevelt (CVN 71)

Commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet To:

Subj: UPDATE ON OPERATION TRIPLE SWINE

- 1. As you know, I had three little pigs who wanted to construct homes but, due to budgetary constraints, could not.
- 2. The three pigs decided they should pool the money they had and play the state lottery, which they did.
- 3. Last month they won the lottery and divided the winnings. Each used his winnings to purchase building materials from Lowe's Building Supply to construct a new house.
- 4. Each of the pigs, who were brothers, decided to use a different material:
 - a. Pig #1 used straw.
 - b. Pig #2, who had whiskers, used sticks.
 - c. Pig #3, the smart one, used bricks.

06 - 14 - 2 - 6 Subj: UPDATE ON OPERATION TRIPLE SWINE

- Shortly after they completed construction, a hungry wolf wandered past and decided he would capture the three little pigs and have them for lunch.
- 6. The wolf vigorously attacked the three pig's houses, with the following results:
- a. He destroyed pig #1 and pig #2's homes by huffing and puffing and then ate them.
- b. But he became disoriented and frightened when his attack on the smart pig's home proved unsuccessful.
- 7. It is apparent that houses made from straw and sticks lack the strength to withstand persistent winds.
- 8. Based upon the preceding report, it is suggested that the name "Operation Triple Swine" (U) be changed.

R. E. TIPPETT By direction

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06-1 4 - 2 - 7

The letter on this page transmits the three classification guides you used in Assignment 1, and the letter from USS ROOSEVELT. You are to mark it with required classification markings.

Letterhead

3320

Ser N3/XXXX 6 Jan XX

From: Commander, Naval Ocean Systems Center

All Students To:

Subj: TRANSMITTAL LETTER

Encl: (1) OPNAVINST S5513.44D, Encl (25)

- (2) OPNAVINST S5513.15, Encl (5)
- (3) OPNAVINST C5513.2, Encl (2) (4) USS ROOSEVELT ltr 3320, Ser N3/S32 of 19 Dec XX

1. Enclosures (1) - (4) are forwarded for your review.

L. W. JONES

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED, BUT MARKED ______ FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY.

06-1 4 - 2 - 8

ASSIGNMENT SHEET 5.3

Control Measures Exercise

INTRODUCTION

This exercise provides practical application of information provided in Lesson Topics:

- 5.1 Control Measures
- 5.2 Destruction

LESSON TOPIC OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of lesson topics 5.1, 5.2, and this team exercise, you will be able to:

- Identify the level of control measures commensurate with various assigned classification designations.
- 2. Determine administrative requirements involved in applying control measures for various forms of classified information.
- 3. Describe administrative procedures associated with receipt and routing of classified information.
- 4. Apply risk management strategies to determine level of risk in association with the control measures for various forms of classified information.
- 5. Determine requirements for destruction of various types of classified information.
- 6. Describe procedures for safeguarding and accountability of burn bags.
- 7. Identify administrative requirements for the destruction process.
- 8. Determine destruction detail responsibilities.

06-1 5-3-1

EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

Each Team will work the same exercise which includes three scenarios and ten questions to be discussed and considered for each scenario. All necessary documentation is provided to do the exercise.

You will describe risk management procedures/methods used in determining the level of control measures necessary, preparing classified information for destruction, safeguarding of burn bags, identifying vulnerabilities and actions necessary in regards to the Industrial Security Program (working with government contractors) and computer security programs.

06-1 5-3-2

SCENARIOS FOR TEAM EXERCISE 5.3 ASSIGNMENTS

SCENARIO #1 - SMALL SHORE BASED COMMAND

Total command compliment is 80 personnel. Command's mission is to provide administrative and logistical support to several afloat commands. You hold no Top Secret information and at present there are no Top Secret accounting procedures established. A limited amount (100 pieces) of Secret information is maintained in the Security Manager's office. You still are maintaining a lot of classified paper items but now also have several classified CDs. You are not sure how much Confidential information you hold, but a reasonable estimate would be 20 various publications, of which half are NWP's and a maximum of 150 other types of information (e.g., correspondence, messages). There are no permanently assigned contractor personnel, however, on the average twice yearly contractor personnel are aboard for short durations (30 days or less). You are in the process of discussing the need for a SIPRNET hook-up, with 10 user accounts with anticipation that 3 computers for SIPRNET connection will be installed within the next six to nine months. The 3 SIPRNET computers will require hook-up to one printer, location yet undetermined. There are two small desk-top cross-cut shredders within the command for the purpose of destroying classified paper information but one is inoperable.

SCENARIO #2 - MEDIUM AFLOAT COMMAND

Total command compliment is 600 personnel. You have 42 pieces of Top Secret holdings with an established accounting system. Secret information numbers 825 pieces with most sub-custodied out. In addition, an extensive NWP Library is maintained. are 250-300 Confidential publications/messages etc. that are in the custody of Department Heads/Division Officers. Contractors visit the command on a regular basis mainly for technical support for the Engineering and Operations Departments. There are two permanently assigned technical representatives at the command who are aboard during underway periods. You still maintain a lot of classified paper items. You destroy, on average, 10 - 20 burn bags quarterly and have what is felt to be adequate procedures in place, but routinely have to transport burn bags to other facilities for destruction. You now hold a large amount of classified CDs and must transmit them back to NSA for destruction. For SIPRNET use the command has 5 terminals (with removable hard drives) hooked up to a server (located in a secure

06-15-3-3 room) and 20 user accounts. All 5 SIPRNET terminals are connected to one printer, located in the secure room.

SCENARIO #3 - LARGE SHORE BASED COMMAND

You have 1300 military, 250 civilian and 40 contractor personnel assigned. Top Secret information is limited to 10 pieces with established control procedures in place. A military Secret Control Officer is assigned due to the large volume (12,000 pieces) of Secret information maintained (both paper product and CDs). An NWP Library is maintained as well as a Technical Library with approximately 2,000 pieces of Confidential and controlled unclassified information. You use burn bags and destroy approximately 30 bags quarterly and transmit back approximately 50 CDs monthly to NSA for destruction. You have a large mulcher facility that is under your cognizance and other commands throughout the area use your facility for the destruction of their classified paper products. A SIPRNET system with 50 terminals, each with a removable hard drive, hooked up to 2 servers with 100 user accounts was recently installed. The servers are in a secure room, however most of the terminals are in working offices. Ten SIPRNET terminals each are hooked up to a printer (5 total) located in one of 2 secure rooms. The CO has just advised you that he wants a printer in his officer for his SIPRNET system and wants to know if this is feasible.

(OPTIONAL) SCENARIO #4 - MEDIUM SIZE MARINE COMMAND

You have 800 Marines and 18 Navy personnel assigned. You are eligible to receive Top Secret information with a Top Secret Control Officer and Assistant assigned; but do not currently hold any TS information. You have a total of 500 Secret and Confidential documents/messages/CDs. At present 16 personnel hold a TS clearance and 43 personnel hold Secret security clearances. You have a Classified Material Control Center (CMCC) located in your S-1 Adjutant's Office. Also, 6 Secondary Control Points are located in the S-2, S-3, S-4 and S-6 offices. There is an EKMS Manager, a STU-III custodian, and an Information Assurance Manager (IAM) in the S-6 office. The S-2 Office is responsible for the Command Personnel Security Program (Clearance/Access) with the Adjutant being responsible for control measures for classified information held within the Command. You destroy an average of 3 burn bags of classified information per week utilizing a small desk-top approved shredder in your command that is used routinely. Access to a large approved mulcher is available for use at the Division. Your Command's Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) has not been updated recently. Message traffic is received via a secure network located in the S-6 Office spaces. You routinely have visitors within your command including cleared contractor personnel who

06-15 - 3 - 4 require access to Secret information. Your SIPRNET consists of 10 laptop hook ups, with one printer in S-2.

ASSIGNMENT

As the Security Manager, discuss the following questions to determine adequate Control Measures and Destruction procedures in the Command for each scenario:

- 1. Vulnerabilities and Risk Management
- 2. Top Secret Accounting Procedures
- Secret/Confidential Information Control Procedures to 3. include SIPRNET
- 4. Industrial (government contractors) Security Program for Contractor Personnel
- 5. Factors to consider in regards to computer security
- 6. Other issues (i.e., Reproduction Equipment/Fax Machines etc.)
- 7. Destruction Methods/Procedures that are in place
- 8. Need for Security Servicing Agreements/Clean Out Day etc.
- Other Areas of Consideration that may need to be 9. visited.

06-1 5-3-5

ASSIGNMENT SHEET 5.7

Safequarding/Storage Exercise

INTRODUCTION

This exercise provides practical application of information provided in Lesson Topics:

- 5.5 Safeguarding
- 5.6 Storage

LESSON TOPIC OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of lesson topics 5.5, 5.6, and this exercise, you will be able to:

- Apply the basic policy for protection of 1. classified information.
- 2. Select the best protective measures to use in a given situation, either through the formation of restricted areas or the application of other security measures.
- 3. Describe a system for use and control of security badges in a given situation.
- 4. Select a proper entry/exit program to use in a given situation.
- Determine the appropriate security checks to be performed at the end of the day in a given situation.
- 6. Apply the requirements for the storage of classified information in a given situation.

EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

All teams use the same set of materials, which includes a scenario, the assignments, and all necessary documentation to do the exercise. You will be preparing documents and developing procedures for security container allocation and use and safequarding measures.

Documentation Provided

		Page
Scenario:	Security Manager for a Staff that is moving from its present	
	offices to another building	5-7-3
Assignment	s	5-7-7 & 8
Scale draw	ring of new office spaces	5-7-9
Security o	container inventory	5-7-10

SCENARIO

You are the Security Manager for a staff located in CONUS. The staff is vacating their old spaces and moving into new spaces; \$20,000 has been allocated to Security for additional security containers. At this point the Chief of Staff and department heads have not decided which spaces will be allocated to which departments.

The Security Manager is to make a recommendation for space allocation based on security considerations, and is to develop a plan for the storage of classified information and the establishment of various measures for the protection of classified information.

Classified information is used throughout staff spaces. Regular Top Secret discussions are held in the Admiral's/General's office and Top Secret information is stored in the Admiral's/General's office and in Operations. The conference room is used by your staff and by other commands and frequently includes uncleared personnel.

The staff has sufficient personnel to man a two-person watch 24 hours a day. Operations has received more classified information that requires additional storage space equivalent to two five-drawer class 5 or 6 security containers, and anticipates a need for another two security containers during the next 6 to 10 months. Electronics also has a need for two additional security containers for the storage of confidential and secret information and equipment, as well as storage for a PC size computer used to process classified information. Additionally the Chief of Staff has informed you that it has become necessary for the Admiral/General to use and store secret and confidential information in his residence which is located on the base.

The departments require space as follows:

Operations 3 offices (all personnel have at least a

secret clearance)

Electronics 1 office (all personnel have at least a

secret clearance)

Supply 2 offices (some personnel have no clearance)

Maintenance 2 offices (some personnel have no

clearance)

There are three STU III's for the Staff.

Building Description

Exterior: Brick construction; built in 1950.

Interior: All offices have solid wooden doors, a 3-foot void between the false and true ceiling, and a 1-foot diameter air conditioning/heating duct entering the office above the false ceiling. Spaces 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, and 14, have double-hung wooden windows (six over six). There are three exterior entrance/exits. Interior walls are of standard wood and sheet rock construction. There are 17 spaces which include:

Unit Mission

This is a training and readiness staff, with the following departments and manning levels:

- Operations: five officers and seven enlisted 1. (one E-8, two E-7s, two E-6s, and two E-4s)
- Administration: two officers and seven enlisted 2. (one E-7, two E-5s, one E-4, and three E-3s)
- 3. Supply: three officers and five enlisted (one E-8, one E-6, three E-5s and one E-4)
- 4. Maintenance/Engineering: three officers; six enlisted (one E-9, one E-8, two E-7s and two E-5s)

06-1 5 - 7 - 4

- 5. Electronics: three officers and three enlisted (one E-8, and two E-6s)
- 6. Command: two officers (the Admiral/General and the Chief of Staff)

Personnel Summary

	Enlisted	Officers	
	$\overline{E-9, 1}$	18	
	E-8, 4		
	E-7, 5		
	E-6, 5		
	E-5, 7		
	E-4, 3		
	E-3, 3		
Total:	28	Combined unit total:	46

Security container inventory/current user

Class	5,	2	drawer	.2	Admiral/General-1, Chief of Staff-1
Class	3,	4	drawer	.2	.Maintenance-1 Admin-1
Class	5,	4	drawer	.2	.Operations-2
Class	5,	5	drawer	.6	.Supply-1 Admin-2 Operations-1 Electronics-2
Class	6,	5	drawer	.2	.Electronics-2
Total.				L 4	

Budgetary considerations

- The budget for security containers is \$20,000. Α.
- Container cost (approximate, for instructional purposes В. only)

\$10,000 1. Secure room

2. Vault 45,000

3. Security container 3,500 each

Note: All solutions must remain within the budget.


1. Storage

- Review current security container inventory provided and determine the source for additional classified storage for Operations and for Electronics.
- Determine the need for a secure room or vault; if b. needed, recommend where it is to be placed and the measures that must be taken to create the vault or secure room.

Although there are a total of 14 security NOTE: containers in the command, you are provided Security Container inventory information for only 8 containers because they are the only ones that could be looked at for possible consolidation. The others are already filled to capacity with classified information.

- Care of working spaces/inspections/security badges
 - Survey the office spaces and determine which would a. best suit the different departments based on security considerations. (Refer to the Scenario and the office diagram.)
 - Determine what access controls you would recommend b. for the new spaces; e.g., mechanical, electromechanical push-button locks (commonly referred to as cipher locks), locked doors, restricted entry, IDS, etc. (Refer to the Scenario and the office diagram.)
 - Determine the need for an entry/exit inspection C. program, and if needed, how and where it will be used. Will you use security badges?

- Pre-move inventory/Technical Surveillance Countermeasures survey/Residential storage plans and procedures
 - List the items you will need to check in the new a. spaces (opaque windows, trim shrubbery, bars on windows, etc.) when you perform a pre-move survey of the spaces for the purpose of establishing an overall security plan.
 - Should a TSCM be requested? If so, for what b. space?
 - Which spaces should be designated Restricted C. Areas if any?
 - A STU III will be placed in the d. Admiral's/General's Office and in the Operations office. Where would you recommend placement of the third STU III? What security considerations are there in placement of all three STU III's?
 - Describe the procedures and precautions you would implement to allow the General/Admiral to use and store classified in his residence.



	Security Container Inventory									
No.	No. Location		Manufacturer/Type	Unclas	Conf	Sec	TS			
1	Rm 118/Operations	, 5	Hamilton/4 Drawer	15%	50%	10%	0%			
2	Rm 119/Operations	, 5	Mosler/4 Drawer	30%	40%	25%	5%			
3	Rm 119/Operation	, 5	Hamilton/5 Drawer	30%	35%	30%	5%			
4	Rm 119/Operations	v	Remington Rand	80%	20%					
5	Rm 120/Electronics	, 5	Hamilton/ 5 Drawer	35%	30%	20%	15%			
6	Rm 120/Electronics	, 5	Hamilton/5 Drawer	40%	40%	10%	15%			
7	Rm 120/Electroni	ss 6	Mosler/5 Drawer	15%	50%	25%	0%			
8	Rm 120/Electronics	, 6	Hamilton/5 Drawer	50%	30%	20%				

ASSIGNMENT SHEET 7.4

Personnel Security Exercise

INTRODUCTION

This exercise provides practical application of information provided in Lesson Topics:

- 7.1 Personnel Security Policy
- 7.2 Investigations
- 7.3 Clearance and Access

LESSON TOPIC OBJECTIVES

Upon completion of lesson topics 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and this exercise you will be able to:

- Apply personnel security requirements for specific personnel security actions.
- 2. List the correct steps required in requesting a Personnel Security Investigation.
- List the procedures required to determine clearance 3. eligibility and grant access, interim clearance, and request for final clearance.

EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

All teams will perform the same exercise, using the same set of materials. There are three assignments, each including a scenario, an explanation of the assignment, and all necessary documentation to do the exercise.

ASSIGNMENT 1:

SCENARIO

You are Security Manager for USS WASP (LHD-1). The ship has just gotten underway for an indefinite period.

Two months prior to deployment, Operations Specialist Chief Davis reported aboard the command for duty. Initial checkin and screening of his service/medical record for a security clearance determination revealed the clearance certification and that he had completed Level I treatment two years ago following a DUI. He had also had three letters of indebtedness prior to the DUI incident, which were documented on a page 13 entry. Also, financial counseling was documented on a page 13 entry.

Following his Level One treatment, there was no additional evidence of any alcohol or indebtedness-related incidents and his performance evaluations were good.

Since his previous problems appeared to be resolved, OSC Davis was granted Secret access based on a Secret clearance granted by DON CAF, which he required to perform his job.

Two weeks prior to deployment, the command received a letter from a collection agency indicating that OSC Davis was seriously in debt to several creditors.

ASSIGNMENT

Part 1. Determine what recommendation you would make to the OPS Officer and XO regarding OSC Davis' access to classified information, based upon his past record and most recent indication of serious financial problems.

Part 2. List the administrative and management actions to be taken if your recommendation is acted upon.

ASSIGNMENT 2:

SCENARIO

You are the Security Manager for a training command with 150 personnel. When you reported aboard you had no turn over. Now you discover that 5 personnel have been given access to Top Secret, 75 Secret and 70 Confidential. Reviewing the documentation available you also discover the following:

The PSIs for 19 personnel given access to Secret are over 10 years old and there is no record of a SPR having been submitted.

There is evidence that 12 months ago SPRs were submitted for 8 other personnel but no clearance certification has been annotated in JCAVS and no follow up action has been taken.

The JCAVS information for 1 person indicates a PSI was submitted 17 months ago and the PSI is closed. The clearance date indicates this PSI has not been adjudicated.

ASSIGNMENT

List the actions you would take, including description of required forms, to:

- Take appropriate action regarding access until PRs are submitted.
- b. Submit required periodic reinvestigations.
- C. Take follow up actions to ensure PSIs are being processed.
- d. Identify future actions to ensure PRs are submitted when required.

ASSIGNMENT 3:

SCENARIO

As Security Manager for a CONUS shore station, you have a newly reporting officer (LCDR/MAJ) who requires Top Secret NATO (COSMIC) access. The JCAVS indicates he had a favorable SSBI adjudicated five years and six months ago.

ASSIGNMENT

List the procedures necessary to grant clearance and access, identifying and describing the use of required forms.

ASSIGNMENT SHEET 8.2

Security Incidents Team Exercise

INTRODUCTION

This exercise provides practical application of information provided in Lesson Topic 8.1, Loss and Compromise of Classified Information.

LESSON TOPIC OBJECTIVE

Upon completion of lesson topic 8.1 and this team exercise, you will be able to:

- 1. Indicate necessary reporting actions for given situations that involve security incidents.
- 2. Evaluate your command's procedures for actions to take when a security incident occurs, per the requirements of SECNAVINST 5510.36 Chapter 12.

EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

This exercise presents 12 scenarios of security incidents that were submitted to CNO (N09N2). Determine in each case what recommendation the Command Security Manager should make to the Executive Officer and Commanding Officer.

- Was a Preliminary Inquiry report necessary with a JAGMAN 1. initiated, or
- Was it an incident, which could have been handled at the 2. command level?

TEAM AND CLASS DISCUSSION:

In the Team discussions determine the specific course of action the command should take in each scenario. Team leaders will select team members to make class presentations.

06 - 18-2-1

SECURITY VIOLATION EXERCISE

SCENARIO #1

During a meeting with a Department of the Navy (DON) Family Service representative, MM1 Smith is informed that his spouse had threatened to turn over some Confidential information she located in their residence. MM1 Smith immediately informed his Chief, MMCS Jones, of the situation. MM1 Smith stated he brought home the classified information to work on a training plan, and he believed his courier card authorized him to do so. information in question was Confidential Department of Energy Navy Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI). MM1 Smith advised that he wanted to cooperate fully.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #2

On 21 Feb XX, Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Kurtis Jones commits suicide in his off base apartment. The local police and paramedics respond to Mrs. Jones 911 call. CPO Jones is DOA and during an autopsy a diskette is recovered in his clothing and returned to his Command along with a thermoluminescent dosimeter. Command personnel review the diskette and discovered 6 Secretworking graphs of sound noise levels of various equipment lineups related to the improvement of the ship's noise signature. Jones was the Sonar Division Leading Chief and the information was related to work under his cognizance. The NCIS has not been notified of the death because it happened off base.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #3

A wardroom member found a sealed manila folder containing a Top secret document in his stateroom. The Top Secret information should have been in the custody of the TSCO. The TSCO had no record of receipt for the information. Apparently the information was received via Defense Courier Service and instead of being turned over to the TSCO was put in a Top Secret safe in the Tomahawk control room. The Fire Control Officer apparently then took control of the document and kept custody of it in his stateroom until his transfer, where it was subsequently found in the safe he used.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

06 - 18-2-2

SCENARIO #4

Marine quards on routine patrol of a controlled building discovered an office left open and an open security container (containing Secret documents). Information was inventoried and all items were accounted for.

A Reservist CDR on two weeks annual training left without securing the space. The room was unoccupied for approximately 35 minutes. It was determined that there were no non-U.S. or non-cleared personnel in the area during that time.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #5

At approximately 0730 hours on 11 Jan XX, Command members aboard the USS Titanic discovered 2 Government desktop and 2 Government laptop computers missing, including about 30 3.5 inch diskettes and 15 backup database tapes, from the station office which is secured with a cipher lock. According to the NCIS Special Agent assigned to the case there were no signs of forced entry. The ship was docked at the Norfolk Navy base during the theft. Approximately half of the tapes missing contained DOE Confidential information.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #6

On 17 Mar XX, Command personnel discover 3 Top Secret, 3 Secret, and 3 Confidential documents during a routine scan of staff computer systems. The information was discovered on a stand-alone computer authorized for unclassified information only. computer was installed in the Command telecommunications center to allow access to the Internet via a commercial Internet service provider. The center is continuously manned by personnel cleared for Top Secret access. File descriptions indicate the messages were written to the stand alone in Aug of the previous year.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

8-2-3 06 - 1

SCENARIO #7

A security container containing classified working papers was found closed but unsecured at 0530 on a Monday morning. Last notation on security container checklist was that the container was opened at 1630 and closed at 1715 on the preceding Friday. Current inventory of container was not available. Space is located in a magnetic card controlled area. Only personnel who work in the space or have a need for repeated access have key card access. No card access was recorded for the weekend.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #8

A LT found a Confidential message in the bottom of his "in" basket under numerous other documents. The message had been put in the LT's basket the day before but he had been too busy to check his basket until the next day.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #9

On 09 Apr XX, it was reported on at least three occasions that unauthorized Swiss nationals had been granted access to the NAWCWPNS Range Control Center at Point Loma, CA. The Range is an open storage area authorized for open Secret storage. The NCIS was notified and requested exclusive jurisdiction. On 21 Apr XX, the NCIS special agent for the case relinquished jurisdiction.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #10

Several classified documents were discovered in a folder found in a rental car returned to XYZ Rental Cars, in Hanover, MD. folder has been identified as originating on board an attack submarine, based on labels on the outside of the folder and the addressees on messages contained within the folder.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

8-2-4 06 - 1

SCENARIO #11

Several TOP SECRET documents were downloaded to a CD-Rom and improperly removed from a SCIF. This was accomplished by downloading the contents of the CD-ROM to a personal laptop and to a Personal Data Assistant (palm pilot). The laptop's files were not purged and it was left unsecured and later connected to a foreign Internet service.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

SCENARIO #12

On 31 Mar, XX an experienced message clerk downloaded classified and unclassified message traffic using a GATEGUARD computer. She simultaneously downloaded classified messages and copied unclassified messages to a floppy disk. As a result, a SECRET message was released to unauthorized persons in the unclassified message distribution to base departments.

PI & JAGMAN

PI & Handle at Command

8-2-5 06 - 1